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COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw-DuE

FREE SPEECH.-[United States]

PROCESS

OF

LAw-LIBERTY-

In Gitlow v. New York, the fed-

eral Supreme Court for the first time unanimously assumes that
freedom of speech and of the press are among the "liberties" protected from state impairment by the due process clause of the Fourteenth amendment. 2 Gitlow was convicted in New York of violating
a statute that forbade the advocacy of the doctrine that organized government should be overthrown by force or by the assassination of rulers or by any unlawful means. 3 This was affirmed by the
state appellate courts4 and brought to Washington on writ of error.
It was urged for the defendant that, while he had advocated the
forcible overthrow of government, the liberty clause of the Fourteenth amendment protected such utterances save under circumstances where some actual evil was likely to flow from such advocacy-which, it was argued, was not the case here, it being very
unlikely that anyone would be moved to illegal action by the defendant's manifesto, published in an organ of the Left Wing socialists.
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting) as no impairment of legitimate free speech,
though admitting that the Fourteenth amendment protected proper
"liberties" of this sort. In view of the earlier decisions of the
same court that Congress did not violate the First amendment in
forbidding certain utterances designed to interfere with the conduct
of the war (even though there was no proof of a "clear and present
danger" that such utterances would' have such actual effect),5 this
result was to be expected. It would have been extraordinary to hold
that the Fourteenth amendment (and the Fifth, in the same language) protected speech of a character not privileged by the First
amendment. In none of the prior federal cases was the effect of the
Fifth amendment discussed, but it must have been assumed that it
did not go further than the First as regards free speech.
In addition to the important assumption that within proper
limits free speech and a free press are a part of the "liberty" guaranteed against state deprivation by the Fourteenth amendment, the
majority of the court persuasively distinguishes the doctrine ob

Schenck v. United States8 from the Abrams, Schaefer, and Peirce

cases.7 In the Schenck case a federal statute forbidding conspiracies
1.
2.
3.
4.

(1925) 45 S. Ct. Rep. 625.
Ibid. at p. 630.
(1909) N. Y. Laws, c. 88; N. Y. Penal Law, ss. 160-61.
People v. Gitlow (1921) 195 App. D. 773; affd. (1922) 234 N. Y.

132, 539.
5. Abrarns v. United States (1919) 250 U. S. 616; Schaefer v. United
States (1920) 251 U. S. 466; Peirce v. United States (1920) 252 U. S. 239.
6. (1919) 249 U. S. 47.
7. See note 5, supra.
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to obstruct the recruiting service was held to be violated by circulating among drafted men an appeal to oppose the draft, even though
such appeal was not actually successful, Mr. Justice Holmes saying,
for the court:
"The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." s
In the other cases what was forbidden was not merely a certain
likelihood of undesired results that might or might not be caused
by the use of language, but the use of certain language itself: e. g.,
in the Abrams case, language intended to incite resistance to the
war and to curtail the produwtion of ammunition; and in the
Schaefer and Peirce cases, language making false statements intended
to interfere with the military success of the United States. In such
cases"when the legislative body has determined generally, in the constitutional
exercise of its discretion, that utterances of a certain kind involve such
danger of substantive evil that they may be punished, the question
whether any specific" utterance coming within the prohibited class is
likely, in and of itself, to bring about the substantive evil, is not open
to consideration. It is sufficient that the statute itself be constitutional
and that the use of the language comes within its prohibition."
Of course speech that could seldom, if ever, threaten such dangers could not be arbitrarily forbidden, but"That utterances inciting to the overthrow of organized government
by unlawful means, present a sufficient danger of substantive evil to
bring their punishment within the range of legislation discretion, is
clear. Such utterances, by their very nature, involve danger to the
public peace and to the security of the State. They threaten breaches
of the peace and ultimate revolution. And the immediate danger is
none the less real and substantial, because the effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen. The State cannot reasonably be
required to measure the danger from every such utterance- in the nice
balance of a jeweler's scale.

.

.

.

It cannot reasonably be required

to defer the adoption of measures for its own peace and safety until
the revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public
peace or imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction; but it
may, in the exercise of its judgment, suppress the threatened danger in
its incipiency."' 1
Whatever may have been the original conception of 'liberty'
in our due process clauses, it was practically inevitable that some
freedom of speech should be included within it after the unanimous
statement of the Supreme Court in Allgeyer v. Louisiana that it
"embraced the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of his
faculties.""' The possibilities of a further extension of its mean8. (1919) 249 U. S. at 52.
9. 45 S. Ct. Rep. at 631.
10. 45 S. Ct. Rep. at 631.
11. (1897) 165 U. S. 578, 589.
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ing are discussed somewhat apprehensively in a recent leading article
by Charles Warren,1 2 who concludes that"If the doctrine of the Gitlow case is to be carried to its logical and
inevitable conclusion, every one of the rights contained in the Bill of
Rights ought to be and must be included within the definition of 'liberty,'
and must be held to be guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
against deprivation by a State 'without due process of law.' "13
He enumerates these potentially protected rights as including
the free exercise of religion, the right peacefully to assemble, and the
right to keep and bear arms; as well as freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures, self-crimination, cruel and unusual punishments, and the rights to indictment by a grand jury and to jury trial
in criminal and civil cases. As regards the first three there is little
doubt that they are logically included, though only the right to religious freedom would interpose any serious obstacle to such hostile
legislation as could be easily imagined. So many plausible reasons
may be given for limiting the right to assemble or to bear arms that
'liberty' in these respects is rather illusory. Indeed, the same is
true of free speech itself. 14 As regards the other rights mentioned
by Mr. Warren, it is difficult to believe that their infringement is
necessarily or usually any violation of 'liberty,' even in an extended
sense. Of course, after a manner of speaking, it may be urged that
a right to be 'free' from any kind of harmful or forbidden conduct
is a 'liberty,' because 'freedom' and 'liberty' are colloquially synonymous. F.. g., one has a common-law right to be 'free' from all manner of torts, therefore any legislative cutting down of duties to
refrain from torts would be a deprivation of 'liberty' regardless of
the character of the duty affected. But, obviously, serious problems
of constitutional law are not to be settled by such a play upon
words.
The answer to Mr. Warren's argument seems to be this: It is
only interferences with human activities by directly preventing or
forbidding or compelling them that constitute infringements of 'liberty.'. Directly to prevent or to forbid a man from walking or talking or working or writing or praying, or indeed engaging in any
other human activity is properly enough an interference with his
'liberty'-and, if unreasonable, is without due process. So, likewise,
to compel him to walk or talk or work or write or pray, against his
will, interferes with 'liberty,' though if done in a reasonable way
for a reasonable purpose it is not without due process. But to slander him, or to throw a stone through his window, or to break a
contract with him, or to seize his property is not an infringement
of his 'liberty,' even though the ultimate result of these acts is to
diminish his social opportunities or his pecuniary substance so that
he will be less able (or 'free') to satisfy some of his desires. This
12.' (1926) Harv. L. Rev. 39:431.
at 460.
13.
14. Id.
See J. P. Hall "Free Speech in War Time" (1921)
21:526.

Col. L. Rev.
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inability, however, results not from any direct interference with his
activities as such, but from the creation of collateral conditions, like
unpopularity or poverty, that afford less favorable opportunities
for the exercise of such activities. Such conduct seems to affect
'property' rather than 'liberty.' Of course rights of 'liberty' and
of 'property' may often overlap. A prohibition against (a) selling
wholesome fruit, or (b) drinking intoxicating liquor--each lawfully in A's possession-is both an interference with his activities
('liberty') and with the usual incidents of private ownership ('property'). In case (a) this would usually be without due process (being
unreasonable), while in case (b) it would be with due process (being
reasonable).
Of the various guaranties of the Bill of Rights urged by Mr.
Warren to be a part of 'liberty' the following analysis suggests
itself: The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures would ordinarily concern 'property' rather than 'liberty,' the
latter being only collaterally affected. Compulsory self-crimination, if understood as actually compelling a defendant to testify,
would be a violation of 'liberty,' but no one proposes this today.
What is proposed is that a court or jury be permitted to draw an
unfavorable inference from a defendant's voluntary failure to testify.
This, in itself, is purely a matter of procedure, not involving at this
stage rights either of 'liberty' or of 'property.' If, later, as a result
of such a permissible inference, a defendant is imprisoned or fined,
then indeed 'liberty' or 'property' is affected, and the question must
be answered whether the procedure leading to this result complied
with the requirements of due process. So also of a defendant's
rights to a grand or petit jury in criminal or civil cases. These
rights in themselves are neither a part of 'liberty' nor of 'property,'
but if, through a failure to observe them, a defendant is imprisoned,
fined, or subjected to loss of substance, then it may be asked whether
this result (which does affect 'liberty' or 'property') was achieved
by procedural due process. These questions have all been raised
in the United States Supreme Court and the answer uniformly has
been that such procedure was due process.1 5 It would seem to be
no less so, even if the procedural rights thus legislatively taken away
were conceived to be a part of 'liberty,' for it is only deprivations of
'liberty' without due process that are forbidden. The right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishments may involve 'liberty,' as,
for instance, if an outrageously long imprisonment were inflicted
for some trifling offense; but, if the objectionable punishment consisted of branding, this would seem to be no violation of 'liberty.'
Even though one does not share Mr. Warren's fears of the
possible connotations of 'liberty' in the mind of the Supreme Court,
one may, however, heartily agree that even its more restricted mean15. Twining v. New Jersey (1908) 211 U. S. 97 (self-crimination);
Hurtado v. California (1884) 110 U. S. 516 (grand jury unnecessary) ; Iowa
Cent. Ry. v. Iowa (1896) 160 U. S. 389 (common-law jury unnecessary in
civil case) ; Maxwell v. Dow (1900) 176 U. S. 581 (same in criminal case).
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ing should not straight-jacket legislation, and that, as he puts it near
the end of his article:
"If the Court shall in the future give a broad interpretation to the
words 'due process' as affecting 'liberty'; if it shall be slow and reluctant
to regard a state statute as arbitrary or as bearing no reasonable relation to some object of public welfare, then the Court may, by such
action, counteract some of the evils of undue interference with state
legislation, which otherwise may flow from the enlarged definition of
'liberty' recently adopted by it."16
JAMES

PARKER HALL.

COMPULSORY MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE-CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW-REGULATION OF INSURANE-TORTS.-[Massachusetts]

The

increasing number of personal injuries and deaths incident to the use
of automobiles on the public highways and streets of America," and
the continual increase in the number of automobiles in use in this
country, 2 with the further fact that only approximately 30 or 35 per
cent of automobile owners have voluntarily insured themselves
against liability, have led to serious effort to devise some method by
which those injured, and the dependents of those killed, may obtain
pecuniary relief from the tort-feasor. Of course, under present
laws, if no tort has been committed, or if a 'legal wrong' cannot be
proved although committed, no relief is possible.
In two recent cases,3 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts handed down advisory opinions relative to proposed statutes
seeking to deal with the problem under discussion. In the first opinion,' the court was asked by the legislature whether a statute would
be valid prohibiting a person from operating a motor vehicle on the
public highway of the state until he had satisfied an outstanding
judgment against himself founded on a previous tort, through use
of his automobile, either by himself, his servant, his child, or his
ward. The court inq advising the legislators that such a statute
would be constitutional, based its answer upon the ground that this
appeared to it a reasonable method of protecting the public against
injuries upon public highways; and that the classification between
judgment debtors who had and who had not satisfied the judgment
was not discriminatory; but was a reasonable means of obtaining
16. (1926) Harv. L. Rev. vol. 39 at 464.
1. A recent report of the National Safety Council for 1925 states that
21,000 deaths occurred in that year in America from use of automobiles, and
of these 68 per cent occurred on the public highways. Doubtless, the number of those injured was much greater.
2. The number has been variously estimated as between twenty and
twenty-one million at present: (1925) Reports of National Aut6mobile Chamber of Commerce.
3. In re Opinion of the Justices (1925) ...Mass. ... , 147 N. E. 680;
In re Opinion of the Justices (1925) ...Mass .... 147 N. E. 681.

4. 147 N. E. 680.

